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11 Introduction
This paper analyzes the political sustainability of the welfare state in a model where immigration
policy is also endogenous. In the model, the skills of the native population are aﬀected by im-
migration and skill accumulation. Moreover, immigrants aﬀect future policies, once they gain the
right to vote. The main ﬁnding is that the long-run survival of redistributive policies is linked to
an immigration policy specifying both skill and quantity restrictions. In particular, in steady state
the unskilled majority admits a limited inﬂow of unskilled immigrants in order to oﬀset growth in
the fraction of skilled voters and maintain a high degree of income redistribution. The paper also
makes a methodological contribution to the literature on dynamic political choices in macroeco-
nomics that can be studied analytically. First, foresighted, inﬁnitely-lived agents choose a vector
of policies by majority vote. Secondly, the model allows for a time-varying skill distribution and a
general production function, which can generate a variable skill premium.
There is rising concern in many countries about the future of the welfare state. Traditionally,
economists have focused on the ﬁnancial viability of the policies that constitute the so-called welfare
state. A recent trend in macroeconomics, pioneered by Hassler et al (2002), has started to pay
attention to the issue of its political sustainability. In these models, the evolution of the income
(and skill) distribution of the electorate plays a leading role.
Often, the other main concern in countries worried about the sustainability of the welfare state
is immigration, as consistently revealed by survey data for most European countries.1 Indeed, the
fraction of foreign-born in the population of these countries has increased rapidly over the last few
decades. The recent experience in countries with large immigration during the last century reveals
the important role that the vote of immigrants (and their children) plays in current politics. In the
US, Latinos are already the largest minority, which has inﬂuenced substantially political parties’
platforms in recent national and local elections.
Thus, immigration can potentially have an important eﬀect on the future policies adopted in
the host country and, in particular, the size of its welfare state.2 Motivated by this observation,
this paper explores the determinants of the survival of the welfare state, viewed as an income
redistribution mechanism, taking into account the eﬀects of immigration on the labor market and
on future policies. Conceptually, this paper views immigration policy as a decision on admission to
a political community, an approach only recently pointed out by immigration economists, e.g. in
1For instance, Brucker et al (2002) contains an analysis of 1997 Eurobarometer data.
2Clearly, immigration may also aﬀect the composition of public expenditure, although this aspect will be ignored
in the present analysis.
2Hanson et al (2002), but very prominent among immigration researchers in Sociology and Political
science.3
In the fashion of the dynamic political economy models of Hassler et al (2002), I use the notion of
Markovian majority vote equilibrium and provide analytical results. From the technical standpoint,
the model has several novel features: (1) multidimensional voting (on the degree of redistribution
and on the relative size and average skills of immigration ﬂows), inﬁnitely-lived voters, and a general
production function, which is able to generate a time-varying skill premium, as in Krusell, Quadrini
and Rios-Rull (1997).
In the model, the skill distribution of the native population evolves over time, as a result of
skill accumulation and immigration. At each period, the native population chooses immigration
and income redistribution policies by majority vote, taking into account that immigration will
aﬀect labor market outcomes and the skill distribution of next period’s electorate. In the model,
skilled workers are always richer than unskilled ones. In addition, one’s wage can be increased
by admitting immigrants with complementary skills. I assume that there is a pool of potential
immigrants, containing both skilled and unskilled workers. Voters anticipate that immigrants will
become citizens after one period and vote according to their own economic interests, just like the
other voters. As a result, a trade-oﬀ arises between the eﬀects of immigration on current wages
and on future policies. In the model, in the absence of immigration, the welfare state will be
abandoned once the native population becomes skilled enough. In this scenario, I address two main
questions. Can the welfare state survive when immigration policy is endogenous? If so, what are
the corresponding immigration ﬂows?
There are several interesting ﬁndings. First, the long-run survival of redistribution is linked
to an immigration policy implying both skill and quantity restrictions. In particular, an unskilled
majority (the poor) uses immigration policy to oﬀset growth in the fraction of skilled voters in the
population, in order to maintain the political support for redistribution. In addition, the quota on
unskilled immigration is (locally) increasing in the rate of skill accumulation.
The results provide a new insight into the nature of time-consistent immigration policy, an
issue previously not dealt with in the literature. Interestingly, equilibrium immigration policy may
vary with the fraction of skilled workers in the native population. The equilibrium studied exhibits
an endogenous shift from unrestricted skilled immigration, when the country is skill-scarce, to
restricted entry of unskilled immigrants beyond a threshold level for the fraction of skilled natives.
The analysis also identiﬁes a new motive behind immigration restrictions, which might help
3See Cornelius et al (1994) and DeSipio (1996).
3explain why so many countries restrict immigration and the wide social support for such policies.
Voters are concerned about the eﬀects of current immigration ﬂows on future redistribution. In
steady state, the unskilled majority does not admit more skilled immigrants because it would lead
to a reduction in future redistribution. Moreover, there is an additional steady state, with a skilled
majority. In this case, the majority would adopt an identical immigration policy, that is, the same
restricted entry to unskilled immigrants. Despite the potential for higher current consumption,
skilled voters choose not to admit more unskilled immigrants in order to keep redistribution low in
the future.
Finally, I examine the dynamics of immigration and redistribution when immigrants do not
aﬀect domestic policies. This would be the case if immigration were only temporary or if citizenship
is only passed from parents to children (jus sanguinis), rather than obtained by naturalization or
birthplace.4 In this case, equilibrium immigration policy is always characterized by skill restrictions
with no quantity constraints. An unskilled majority admits all available skilled immigrants and
vice versa in the case of a skilled majority. In this case, the size of immigration ﬂows is solely
determined by availability (supply) considerations.
The above theoretical ﬁndings have some interesting empirical implications. First, they suggest
a hypothesis for why immigration policy is typically more restrictive in Europe (as a whole) than
in the US. The reason may be a higher politically feasible degree of redistribution. More generally,
the analysis identiﬁes a set of factors that may help explain international diﬀerences in immigra-
tion restrictions, as well as why these restrictions vary over time. These are diﬀerences in skill
accumulation and diﬀerentials in fertility and political participation rates by skill levels.
The present paper is related to several strands of literature. A rapidly growing body of literature
studies the evolution of the size of government using a dynamic political economy approach. Krusell,
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) study the Markov perfect equilibria
of a model with inﬁnitely lived and perfectly foresighted voters to try to account quantitatively for
the evolution of the size of the US government. The model I propose shares the previous features of
their model, but allows for analytical solutions. In that sense, it is more in the spirit of Hassler et al
(2002, 2003) who study the political sustainability of the welfare state in an overlapping-generations
model that can be solved analytically. In their model, the dynamics of skill accumulation and the
size of the government are also closely related. Immigration is absent in these models.
4Laws regulating access to citizenship at birth are based on two legal principles. According to the jus soli principle,
the child of an immigrant automatically gains citizenship if born in the country. Alternatively, a child inherits
citizenship from his parents, independently of where he was born (jus sanguinis). Bertocchi and Strozzi (2004)
provide an excellent historical account of the evolution over time of citizenship laws at birth in many countries.
4The present work is also related to dynamic models that aim at quantifying the economic eﬀects
of immigration. Storesletten (2000) characterizes the immigration policy that would maximize the
ﬁscal gains for the US, taking as given current demographics, tax rates and expenditure levels.
Implicit in his analysis, voters presume policies to be unaﬀected by the their current immigration
choices. Ben-Gad (2004) analyzes the eﬀects of immigration on the receiving economy in a model
with endogenous capital-accumulation and heterogeneously skilled agents. As mentioned earlier,
Klein and Ventura (2004) use a two-country model with capital accumulation, capital mobility and
diﬀerences in total factor productivity to evaluate the welfare eﬀects of eliminating the (exogenously
given) immigration restrictions.
The model is also related to a young but growing literature on the political economy of immigra-
tion policy. Benhabib (1996) constructs a model where agents with heterogeneous capital holdings
choose immigration policy by majority vote. In his model, there is an exogenously given supply
of potential migrants with diﬀerent endowments of capital. His results suggest that immigration
policy will display cycles over time, with long periods of relatively low (capital-rich) immigration
followed by brief periods of massive (capital-poor) immigration. Roemer and Van der Straeten
(2004) study the consequences of the rise in xenophobia in some European countries for the size of
their welfare states. In their model, voters’ preferences over immigration and government policies
are exogenous. Instead, in the present model voters’ preferences are endogenous to the model.
Voters’ attitudes toward immigration reﬂect their preferences over streams of consumption. Razin,
Sadka and Swagel (2002) extend the work of Metzler and Richard (1981) by including an exogenous
ﬂow of immigrants and study the connection between immigration and income redistribution in a
static model.
The present work is also related to a recent empirical literature on the determinants of voters’
attitudes toward immigration. Brucker et al (2002) provides an excellent collection of immigration
studies for Europe, with an emphasis on the interaction with the welfare state. Scheve and Slaughter
(2001) and Hanson et al (2002) investigate US data. Mayda (2003), and O’Rourke (2003) carry
out cross-country analyses. In all these studies, particular attention is given to the role of the
respondent’s education level on her attitude toward immigration. It is usually found that voters
with lower education levels tend to be more in favor of immigration restrictions. However, even a
majority of highly educated voters support restrictions.
This paper is also tied to a new strand of literature that studies franchise extension. Choosing an
immigration policy is also a decision on enlarging the set of citizen voters in a country. Some recent
contributions to this literature are Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Lizzeri and Persico (2003).
5In these models, some elite decides on whether to allow other (poorer) members of the country
to vote from then on, taking into account the consequences on future policies. More generally,
admission decisions have been studied by the literature on club formation. A recent contribution
to this literature is the paper on dynamic club formation by Barber` a, Maschler and Shalev (2001).
In their model, a set of voters decides on admission to the club, taking into account that the new
club members will participate in future admission decisions. One of their main ﬁndings is “voting
for your enemy” behavior, where some club members vote in favor of admission of candidates that
reduce their current payoﬀ (enemies), due to the anticipation that the new comers will support
some desired policies in the future. This behavior captures the essence of the main result in the
model of the next section.
The paper is structure as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies the autarky
scenario. Section 4 introduces immigration policy. Section 5 analyzes the case where immigration
only aﬀects labor market outcomes. Section 6 discusses some empirical implications of the results
and section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Model
One consumption good is produced by a competitive ﬁrm using two complementary inputs: skilled
and unskilled labor. Let F(L1,L2) be the production function, a continuous, smooth and constant-
returns-to-scale function satisfying the following standard properties: Fi > 0, Fii < 0 for i = 1,2
and F12 > 0. Observe that if we deﬁne k = L2/L1, the previous assumptions imply that F1(1,k) is
a strictly increasing function of k and F2(1,k) is a strictly decreasing function of k. The respective
derivatives (with respect to k) are F12 > 0 and F22 < 0. To save on notation I will use Fi(k) to
denote Fi(1,k), for i = 1,2.
The economy is populated by many agents with two possible skill levels. Unskilled agents will
be denoted by i = 1 and skilled agents by i = 2. These workers can be either natives (born in the
country) or foreign-born (immigrants). Let Ni(t) be the number of native agents of skill level i
in period t and, similarly, Ii(t) will denote the number of immigrants of type i who entered the





where u is an increasing and concave continuous function. I will interpret these preferences in
6a dynastic sense. So ct denotes the consumption of a worker at time t, ct+1 her only child’s
consumption and β ∈ [0,1) is the degree of altruism between parents and children. The expectation
refers to uncertainty about the skill levels of the oﬀspring. Each type-i agent is endowed with one
unit of labor, assumed to be supplied inelastically. Bequests are not allowed.5
In every period, the government redistributes income from the rich to the poor. This is done by
means of a proportional income tax, levied on all workers, and a universal transfer. Let rt ∈ [0,rb]
denote the tax rate in period t. Taxes are paid by all workers, regardless of whether they were
born in the country or not. The collected tax revenue is redistributed to all workers equally in a
lump sum fashion, so the government runs a balanced budget in each period. The net result of the
tax and the transfer is that rich agents are net contributors to the welfare state while poor agents
are net recipients. Mostly, in what follows I shall set rb = 1, a convenient simpliﬁcation. Since
labor supply is inelastic and there are no bequests, taxation is non-distortionary. I shall assume
that, given immigration and redistribution policies, prices and allocations follow a competitive
equilibrium.
Let (N1(t),N2(t)) and (I1(t),I2(t)) be, respectively, the skill distributions of the native-born
workers and the just arrived immigrants in period t. Then period t’s labor force is given by
Li(t) = Ni(t) + Ii(t), i = 1,2.
Note that competitive wages in each period are solely a function of the ratio of skilled to unskilled





The following observation will play an important role in the analysis.
Observation. Individual consumption levels depend solely on rt and kt:
ci(kt,rt) = Fi(kt) + rt (f(kt) − Fi(kt))





is the output per worker. Moreover, f is an increasing as long as F1(k) ≤ F2(k).
5Incorporating an elastic individual labor supply function is feasible but complicates the expressions for the indirect
utility function, which will play an important role in the voting problem.
7Children’s skills are determined stochastically and depend on parental skills. More speciﬁcally,
I assume that intergenerational mobility in skills is governed by a two-state Markov chain with
persistence. That is, let pi be the probability of being skilled given parental skill level i and assume
that p1 < 0.5 < p2. The skills of the children of immigrants are determined identically.6 As a














where Li(t) = Ni(t) + Ii(t).





Recall that wages are just a function of kt. It turns out that we can express the law of motion for
skills as a function of kt too:
nt+1 = M(kt;p1,p2) =
p1 + p2kt
1 − p1 + kt(1 − p2)
,
which maps the skills of the labor force in a given period (the parents) to the skills of the native
population in the next period (their children). To ease notation, I will denote M(kt;p1,p2) by Mkt.
The following observation summarizes the relevant properties of this mapping.




1−p2, it has a unique ﬁxed point at ka =
p1
1−p2, and its inverse function is
kt = M−1(nt+1) =
nt+1(1 − p1) − p1
p2 − nt+1(1 − p2)
.
For k < ka, Mk > k while for k > ka, M is below the 45 degree line.
The following assumption identiﬁes skilled workers as the rich and unskilled workers as the
poor, which ties together the distributions of income and skills.
Assumption 1: F2(kh) > F1(kh), where kh ≥ ka is some suﬃciently large skilled ratio.7
6This assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis and it is also roughly consistent with data on the educational
attainment of the children of immigrants in the US. Disaggregation by ethnicity shows substantial variation, with
some groups displaying higher skilled probabilities than natives and some lower ones. But overall, in the postwar
period, there seems to be small diﬀerence between native-born and US-born.
7More precisely, we need k
h ≥ max{k
a,b(1)}, where b(n) is a function describing the supply of potential skilled
immigrants, to be deﬁned shortly.
8This assumption guarantees that a positive skill premium, although it can vary over time. As
a result, skilled workers are always richer than unskilled workers. Clearly, a positive skill premium
would endogenously arise if agents made investment decisions over costly skills.
For now, we shall assume that the children of immigrants are born with voting rights (jus soli),
as is the case in the US and in many other countries. So in most of the paper the words citizen,
voter and native-born worker will be synonymous. However, in some countries citizenship is only
transmitted from parents to children (jus sanguinis). As we shall see later, the jus sanguinis case
can be analyzed as a speciﬁc case of the general model.
2.1 Endogenous Policies
This section describes the equilibrium concept employed in the paper. Formally, the equilibrium
concept will be an adaptation of Markov perfect equilibrium to allow for majority vote and where
prices and the consumption allocation follow a competitive equilibrium, given policies. The main
feature of the model is that voters anticipate that the current immigration policy will not only aﬀect
the labor market, but also future immigration and redistribution policies, given that the children
of immigrants will also vote.
Following the convention of the literature on dynamic games, I proceed by deﬁning payoﬀ
functions and the set of feasible policies. Recall that consumption levels in each period can be
expressed as a function of that period’s skilled ratio in the labor force (which includes recent
immigrants) and the tax rate. Thus, the payoﬀ function for an i-skill voter is given by
vi(k,r) = u[(1 − r)Fi(k) + rf(k)], i = 1,2.
That is, each worker’s consumption level is a convex combination between her own wage and output
per worker in the economy. The weights are given by the tax rate, r. When the tax rate is zero,
and indeed for any tax rate, unskilled consumption increases in k. When the tax rate is one, both
types of workers have the same consumption level, which increases in k.
Following Hassler et al (2002), I shall take as state variable the skilled-to-unskilled ratio in the
native population, n. States with n < 1 are unskilled-majority states while states with n > 1 are
skilled-majority states. When there is a tie, I will assume that the group that chose policies in the
last period can choose them again. A convenient way of capturing this (status-quo) assumption is
to deﬁne tie states n = 1− (when the unskilled can choose policies) and n = 1+ (when the skilled
can choose policies). I will denote the set of feasible states n by state space by Ω = [kl,1−]∪[1+,kh].
9The special structure of the law of motion and these payoﬀ functions implies that voters will
be indiﬀerent between any immigration pair giving to the same value of k. Thus, I shall restrict
the policy space to pairs of (k,r). Note that for a given skill distribution of the native population,
n, attaining some desired skilled ratio in the labor force, say k < n, requires admitting mostly
unskilled immigrants. In particular, taking as given the skill composition of the (mostly unskilled)
immigrant ﬂow - perhaps because of the speciﬁc details of admission policies-, attaining the desired
value of k implies choosing the size of the immigration ﬂow, relative to the size of the native
population. I shall often refer to the choice of k as the choice of immigration policy.
Let us describe now the set of feasible policies at each state n ∈ Ω. I will assume that feasible
tax rates are independent of the current state, namely, r ∈ [0,rb], where unless speciﬁed otherwise,
rb = 1. Instead, the set of feasible skilled ratios in the labor force, which includes recent immigrants,
depends on the state: k ∈ [kl,b(n)], where 0 < kl ≤ n0 and b is a continuous and increasing function
that satisﬁes b(n) ≥ n and b(n0) ≥ kl. The lower bound is assumed to be state-independent. The
interpretation is that there is a very large number of potential unskilled immigrants that are willing
to migrate as long as they receive a minimum wage. At kl, the unskilled wage they would obtain
hits the outside option of the potential unskilled immigrants. In contrast, there is a limited amount
of potential skilled immigrants and, as a result, the attainable skilled ratios (kt) are some function
of the pre-immigration skilled ratio in the host country (nt). In particular, if no skilled immigrants
are available we have b(n) = n. I will deﬁne the set of feasible policy pairs in state n ∈ Ω by
Γ(n) = [kl,b(n)] × [0,rb].8
For a given pair of skilled ratios before and after immigration, respectively nt and kt, I will
measure the skill-content of immigration ﬂows by σt = h(kt) − h(nt), the diﬀerence between the
skilled fraction in the labor force (which includes the recently arrived immigrants) and the skilled
fraction among native population.9 Note that when immigration is mostly unskilled (kt < nt), σt
is negative. In this case, lower values of σt (i.e. larger in absolute value) will be interpreted as
larger inﬂows of unskilled immigrants. Conversely, when immigration is mostly skilled (kt > nt),
σt is positive, with higher positive values of σt associated to larger inﬂows of skilled immigrants.
Thus, σt also provides a measure of the size of immigration ﬂows relative to the size of the native
population.
As noted earlier, the process for skill accumulation can be characterized by an increasing function
8Ortega (2004) analyzes a similar model where rb = 0 and b(n) = k
u > k
l.
9Function h(x) = x/(1+x) maps skilled-to-unskilled ratios into skilled fractions and h(0) = 0, h(∞) = ∞, h
0 > 0
and h
00 < 0. Alternatively, we could have simply deﬁned σt = kt − nt.
10mapping skilled ratios in the labor force in one period into skilled ratios in the native population
one period later:
nt+1 = M(kt;p1,p2) =
p1 + p2kt
1 − p1 + kt(1 − p2)
,
where M is an increasing function. Due to intergenerational persistence, admitting unskilled im-
migrants in one period translates into reducing the skilled ratio among the natives in the next
period. As we shall see, immigration ﬂows will be intimately related to the rate of skill growth
across generations. It will be convenient to measure skill growth by γt = h(nt+1) − h(kt). Observe
that when γt > 0, there is skill growth: the average child is more skilled than the average parent.
Clearly, there is skill growth in the economy if (and only if) k < ka.10
We are now ready to state the equilibrium concept. Essentially, it is an adaptation of Markov
perfect equilibrium that takes into account that policies are chosen by majority and that the con-
sumption allocation and prices are a competitive equilibrium for any given policies. An equilibrium
is a policy rule (k,r) : Ω −→ R2
+ that assigns a policy pair (k(n),r(n)) to each state n ∈ Ω.
Equilibrium requires the policy rule to prescribe, in each state, a policy pair that is optimal for the
group in the majority. In addition, voters correctly anticipate the eﬀects of current policy choices
on the future state. More formally, we have the following:
Deﬁnition. A majority-vote equilibrium is a tuple (k,r,V1,V2) such that
i) Given (k,r) : Ω → R2
+, (ex post) continuation values are given by
Vi(n) = vi[k(n),r(n)] + β[(1 − pi)V1(Mk(n)) + piV2(Mk(n))]
= vi[k(n),r(n)] + βCi(Mk(n)), for all n ∈ Ω and i = 1,2.
ii) In all unskilled majority states, n ≤ 1−,
V1(n) = max
(k,r)∈Γ(n)
v1(k,r) + βC1(Mk), for i = 1,2,
iii) and in all skilled majority states, n ≥ 1+,
V2(n) = max
(k,r)∈Γ(n)
v2(k,r) + βC2(Mk), for i = 1,2,
where Γ(n) = [kl,b(n)] × [0,rb].11
10Again, we could deﬁne γt = nt+1 − kt too.
11I shall refer to Ci(n) as the ex ante continuation value of an agent of skill level i, who still does not know her
child’s skills.
11This deﬁnition has become relatively standard in the literature on dynamic political economy
models in macroeconomics since the work of Krusell, Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull (1997). As in their
model, here voters’ preferences are deﬁned over inﬁnite policy sequences. But, in contrast to their
analysis, we can study the equilibrium analytically, in the fashion of Hassler et al (2002).
In the previous deﬁnition, note that voters are aware that the current immigration policy has a
direct eﬀect on the composition of next period’s electorate, that is nt+1 = M(kt). This suggests the
existence of an intertemporal trade-oﬀ. Consider the decision process of a skilled native voter. She
realizes that admitting unskilled immigrants will have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on her current wage due to
factor complementarity. However, such an immigration ﬂow will increase the fraction of unskilled
voters in the next period, which is likely to lead to the adoption of immigration and redistribution
policies that go against the interests of (the children of) current skilled voters.
Let us state the following very intuitive result.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, r(n) = 1 if n ≤ 1− and r(n) = 0 if n ≥ 1+.
In words, there is income redistribution only in states where the unskilled are in the majority.
The reason is that current redistribution does not aﬀect next period’s state (and the positive skill
premium). Moreover, the tax rate always takes corner values because labor supply and saving
decisions are totally inelastic, as we shall see, a convenient simplifying assumption.
3 Autarky
Prior to examining the interaction between immigration and redistribution, it will be helpful to
examine the dynamics of the model when there is no immigration of either type (autarky) but
income redistribution is endogenously determined by majority vote.
In the absence of immigration, the skill distribution of the labor force and of the native popu-
lation (electorate) always coincide. Hence, nt+1 = M(nt;p1,p2), which converges monotonically to
a unique steady state at ka = p1/(1 − p2).
Absent immigration choices, the equilibrium of the model is quite trivial. The skilled ratio
monotonically converges to the steady state. Along the process, there is income redistribution as
long as the majority is unskilled (assumption 1). As the next result summarizes, whether there is
redistribution in steady state depends solely on the transition probabilities.
Lemma 2. Suppose that n0 < ka.
12i) If p1 ≤ 1 − p2, redistribution is sustained forever.
ii) If p1 > 1 − p2 redistribution is permanently abandoned after a ﬁnite number of periods.
The intuition is straightforward. Unskilled workers are always poorer than skilled workers and
thus impose maximum redistribution whenever they can. If ka < 1, the unskilled are always in the
majority but if ka > 1, eventually the majority becomes skilled and redistribution is abandoned
forever. Let us turn now to the main question of the paper: the political sustainability of the welfare
state. To do so, we make an additional assumption, which implies that, in autarky, redistribution
will be eventually abandoned.
Assumption 2: n0 < 1 < ka =
p1
1−p2.
A simple calculation using US data from the General Social Survey allows us to evaluate this
assumption. Deﬁne an individual as being skilled if he or she had 14 years of education or more
(some college) and let us say that an individual comes from a skilled family if his or her father
was skilled.12 I estimate pi by calculating the fraction of skilled individuals that were born in a
family of type i = 1,2. I ﬁnd that b p1 = 0.33 and b p2 = 0.78, with very small standard errors. When
the estimation is restricted to the subsample of children with foreign-born parents the results are
quite similar: b p1 = 0.37 and b p2 = 0.83. Note that these estimates satisfy that p1 > 1 − p2 and
p1 < 0.5 < p2.
The stage is now set to address the main question of the paper. When immigration policy is
endogenous, can redistribution be maintained in the long run?
4 Can Immigration save the welfare state?
Let us now analyze the case where immigration policy and redistribution are both chosen at each
period. The key feature of the environment is that voters realize that immigration not only af-
fects their labor market outcomes (the skill premium), but also domestic politics. More speciﬁcally,
voters anticipate that current immigration will aﬀect next period’s income redistribution and immi-
gration policies. Keep in mind that the model is “biased” toward the elimination of redistribution
(assumption 2), that is, in autarky redistribution would eventually be abandoned. Can the welfare
state, interpreted as income redistribution from rich to poor, survive in this scenario? What is the
relation between the skills of natives and the selected immigrants?
12Ortega and Tanaka (2004) analyze cohort diﬀerences in the eﬀects of paternal and maternal education on educa-
tional attainment.
134.1 Immigration and Redistribution in steady state
We shall say that an equilibrium policy rule (k,r) has a steady state, denoted by n∗ ∈ Ω, if the
equilibrium skill composition of the native population is constant over time when n∗ is the initial
condition. It follows that in a steady state, redistribution and immigration policy are constant from
then on. More speciﬁcally, the timing protocol of the model implies that if n∗ is a steady state then
Mk(n∗) = n∗ or, equivalently, k(n∗) = M−1(n∗). Observe that in steady state skill growth and the
skill-content of immigration ﬂows must oﬀset each other:
γ∗ = −σ∗ = h(n∗) − h(k(n∗)).
Thus, if a steady state displays skill growth, it must feature unskilled immigration as well. Of
course, an equilibrium with steady state redistribution may fail to exist. Establishing existence, by
construction, is the task of the next section. For now, let us just state the following simple result.
Proposition 1. Steady state immigration is unskilled if and only if n∗ < ka. Thus, any steady
state with income redistribution displays unskilled immigration. A steady state without income
redistribution involves unskilled immigration if n∗ < kaand skilled immigration otherwise.
4.2 An equilibrium with redistribution
It is well known that the set of equilibria in inﬁnite dynamic games can be rather large (even under
the Markovian restriction) and a full characterization is often diﬃcult. The same is true in the
present model. so this section adopts a constructive approach. First, I propose a policy rule that
gives rise to an outcome path where redistribution is maintained forever. Next, I shall provide
conditions for that policy rule to be an equilibrium. Finally, I shall argue that this particular
equilibrium provides interesting empirical insights.
Let us start by deﬁning a particular skilled ratio. Let φ be such that M(φ;p1,p2) = 1. That is,
when the current labor force (after immigration) is kt = φ, it is the case that there is a tie in next
period’s election, which allows the incumbent majority to choose policies once again. It is easy to
show that φ = (1 − 2p1)/(2p2 − 1) and, under assumption 2, φ < 1 < ka, implying skill growth at
any k ≤ φ.





(b(n),1) if n < b−1(φ)
(φ,1) if b−1(φ) ≤ n ≤ 1−
(φ,0) if n ≥ 1+
. (1)
14In words, the policies prescribed are as follows. For unskilled majority states when the population is
relatively low skilled, the policy rule postulates full redistribution and the maximum feasible skilled
immigration, coinciding with skilled voters’ favorite static policy mix. When the skills of the native
population reach a certain threshold, n = b−1(φ), the policy rule speciﬁes full redistribution and
k = φ, the highest skilled ratio that allows unskilled voters to retain the majority. Policies are
constant across skilled majority states: no redistribution and again k = φ, which is the skilled ratio
that generates the highest possible skilled wage while maintaining a skilled majority. Note that
there are two steady states: n∗ = 1− and n∗ = 1+. In the former, there is full redistribution while
in the latter there is no redistribution and both display k∗ = k(n∗) = φ. Observe that, given our
initial condition, the economy would start in a situation with income redistribution that would be
maintained indeﬁnitely.
The rest of the section provides conditions under which policy rule (1) is an equilibrium policy
rule. We shall start by examining the (ex ante) continuation values along the equilibrium path,
that is, voters’ beliefs about which policies would be adopted in each conceivable state. Recall that
ex ante continuation values where deﬁned as
Ci(n) = (1 − pi)V1(n) + piV2(n), n ∈ Ω,
and recall that Vi depends on the postulated policy rule. Using the deﬁnition of equilibrium, we
can explicitly solve for the continuation values implied by policy rule (1).
Lemma 3. The ex ante continuation values implied by policy rule (1) are:
Ci(n) =

     

















if n < b−1(φ)
u[f(φ)]
1−β if b−1(φ) ≤ n ≤ 1−
ai1E1 [v(φ,0)] + ai2E2 [v(φ,0)] if n ≥ 1+
,
where T(n) and aij(β,p2,p1) are deﬁned in the proof, and Ei [v(φ,0)] = (1−pi)v1(φ,0)+piv2(φ,0).
It is worth noting that C1(n) is non-decreasing over [kl,1−] and C2(n) is constant over [1+,kh].
In unskilled majority states, C1 = C2 because there is full redistribution along the outcome
path originated from any unskilled majority state. In contrast, ex ante continuation values diﬀer
for both types of voters in skilled-majority states due to consumption levels being determined solely
by wages.
15Let us turn now to the determination of voters’ political preferences. Given a believed policy
rule, a voter with skill level i compares alternative policy pairs according to
Wi(k,r) = vi(k,r) + βCi(Mk),
where the continuation value function is given by the previous lemma. Recall that the set of feasible
policy rules in state n is given by r ∈ [0,1] and k ∈ [kl,b(n)], where b(n) ≥ n.
Let us examine the political preferences of unskilled voters or, put diﬀerently, their best re-
sponses to the postulated policy rule. We shall need the following assumption.
Assumption 3: u[f(φ)] > (1 − β)u[f(b(1))] + βu[F1(φ)].
In words, the previous assumption requires that u[F2(φ)] be high enough relative to u[F1(φ)].13
To see this, consider keeping F1(φ) ﬁxed and raising F2(φ). Clearly, output per worker, f(φ), will
increase. Intuitively, assumption 3 guarantees a high incentive to redistribute by inducing a high
opportunity cost to the unskilled (poor) of living in an economy without redistribution, under the
assumption of p1 = 0. The next lemma provides suﬃcient conditions for unskilled voters’ favorite
policy pair to coincide with the prescribed policy rule.
Lemma 4. For low enough p1, policy rule (1) coincides with unskilled voters’ favorite policies
in unskilled-majority states.
The intuition for the result is simple. For very low values of n, the policy rule requires unskilled
voters to want to admit as many skilled immigrants as feasible. They are happy to do so given that
it increases output per worker and still assigns them the majority. Eventually, as the electorate’s
skills rise, unskilled voters face a trade-oﬀ. If they choose immigration policy so as to maximize
output per worker once again, the majority in the next period will be skilled and redistribution
will be abandoned forever. To avoid that, the unskilled majority shifts immigration policy toward
admitting (restricted) ﬂows of unskilled immigrants.
We now turn to skilled voters’ political preferences. As before, we shall need an extra assump-
tion.
Assumption 4: u[F2(φ,0)] > (1 − β)u[F2(kl,0)] + βu[f(φ)].
13Moreover, the inequality holds if β is close enough to one and fails if it is close enough to zero.
16This conditions states that, when p2 = 1, the one-period gain (for skilled voters) from admitting
the largest feasible quantity of unskilled immigration is smaller than the accumulated loss, caused
by the redistribution that would take place from that period onward. The inequality makes clear
that this is the case when F2(φ) is large relative to F1(φ), that is there is high labor income
inequality in the absence of redistribution.14 We now have the following result.
Lemma 5. For high enough p2, policy rule (1) coincides with skilled voters’ favorite policies
in skilled-majority states.
The following proposition collects all these results. The proposition requires no proof, as it
simply combines the previous lemmas.
Proposition 2. If intergenerational persistence is high enough for both types of voters, policy
rule (1) is an equilibrium. Starting from a relatively unskilled native population, he main features
of the equilibrium path are:
i) Income redistribution is maintained forever.
ii) After several periods of skilled immigration (only limited by its supply), a steady state is
reached where a restricted quantity of unskilled immigrants is admitted in each period.
iii) If skilled voters were to decide the policies, redistribution would be permanently abandoned
and the same restricted ﬂow of unskilled immigration as in ii) would be chosen.
The intuition for the result is quite simple. When the fraction of the native population who are
skilled is very low, there is no future cost for the unskilled majority from pursuing their favorite
static policies: full redistribution and unrestricted skilled immigration. Immigration policy rein-
forces the domestic skill accumulation process. Eventually, a trade-oﬀ arises. Continued admission
of skilled-immigrants entails a cost, in terms of transferring the decision power over future policies
to skilled voters, which would result in the termination of income redistribution. To maintain
redistribution, the unskilled majority reverses the use of immigration policy and starts admitting
a steady inﬂow of unskilled immigrants at each period. Now, immigration policy is used to oﬀset
skill growth. The unskilled majority admits a restricted amount of unskilled immigrants in order
to regenerate the political support for redistribution. This behavior is reminiscent of the so-called
14Alternatively, we can view the assumption as requiring a relatively low elasticity for the skilled wage to changes
in the skilled ratio. It is worth noting that both assumptions 3 and 4 can hold simultaneously. Fix F1(φ) and
consider increasing F2(φ) until assumption 3 holds. Along this process, both sides of the inequality in assumption 4
increase. However, the left-hand side increases by more. Hence, for a high enough value of F2(φ), both inequalitites
will simultaneously hold.
17“voting for your enemy” behavior in Barber` a, Maschler and Shalev (1998), a model of dynamic
club formation. The group in the majority chooses to admit immigrants (new club members) of
their same skill level, incurring a cost in terms of lower current consumption. The reason is purely
strategic. When the newcomers gain the right to vote, they are expected to support the same
policies as the current majority.
An important feature of this equilibrium is that it provides a new insight on the nature of
quantity restrictions on immigration. Virtually every country restricts, explicitly or implicitly,
inﬂows of immigrants. Why is this so? The previous proposition suggests that it is related to
concerns on the future of redistributive policies. The unskilled majority in the equilibrium supports
the admission of unskilled immigrants in order to regenerate the political support for redistribution.
However, this majority is aware that unskilled immigration has a cost in terms of lower consumption.
And, as a result, chooses to restrict the quantity of unskilled immigrants admitted.
Although there might be other explanations for why countries restrict immigration, the one
proposed here is attractive for a number of reasons. First, it is consistent with the wide social
support for immigration restrictions consistently found in survey data. In the equilibrium discussed
above, unskilled voters support immigration restrictions. But skilled voters support them too, since
they would adopt the same immigration policy should they be in the majority. Their appetite for
unskilled immigrants is limited by the increase in taxes that would result from larger unskilled
immigration. Clearly, there are other reasons why a large part of society might want to restrict
immigration. It suﬃces to assume that individuals are xenophobic and dislike foreigners. However,
the current economic-political interpretation is particularly appealing as it identiﬁes a number of
factors that aﬀect the quantity (and skill) of immigration ﬂows. Hence, the model can be used to
formulate predictions about policy changes and can perhaps help explain international diﬀerences
on immigration restrictions. The following section explores these implications further.
Another interesting feature of the equilibrium is the endogenous shift in immigration policy, as
the fraction of skilled natives increases over time. When there is a very low fraction of skilled in the
native population, the chosen immigrants are skilled. But beyond a threshold, the country becomes
“skill-abundant” and starts admitting unskilled immigrants. The experience of recent countries of
immigration may be interpreted along these lines. Until recently, immigration into Spain had higher
average levels of income and education than the natives. The substantial emigration of unskilled
Spaniards would reinforce the eﬀects of skilled immigration on the skill composition of the Spanish
labor force. However, the last decade has witnessed a dramatic reversal in these migration patterns.
Nowadays, the average education and income of immigration ﬂows into Spain is signiﬁcantly lower
18than that of native Spaniards..
Let us now discuss the assumptions needed to sustain the above equilibrium. As we have seen,
the existence of this equilibrium relies on two assumptions: high intergenerational persistence and
high labor income inequality (prior to redistribution). How reasonable are these assumptions? A
large literature on intergenerational persistence in income and education within families strongly
suggests a substantial degree of persistence, although there is still an ongoing discussion about the
relative contribution of several competing explanations. The second important assumption is a high
value of F2(φ) relative to F1(φ), that is high labor income (or wealth) inequality in a steady state
without redistribution. A large literature in economics has analyzed the extent and the reasons
behind the large increase in income inequality in many countries over the last few decades. There
is a growing consensus that intense skilled-biased technological change has magniﬁed the degree of
labor income inequality in the last few decades in many countries. In a nutshell, both conditions
seem quite plausible for a large set of countries. It is worth noting that the previous equilibrium also
relies on voters being altruistic (non-myopic) to some degree. It is easy to show that when β = 0,
the only equilibrium implies a cyclic behavior of the economy, aﬀecting the degree of redistribution
and labor income inequality, as well as the skills and size of immigration ﬂows.15 Several periods
of relatively small (skilled) immigration and redistribution are followed by one period of massive
(unskilled) immigration and a sharp reduction in taxes. In this situation, redistribution is only
compatible with skilled immigration.
4.3 The size of immigration ﬂows
Countries diﬀer on how restrictive their immigration policies are and, consequently, on the num-
ber of immigrants they receive (even in per capita terms). Why is it so? In the context of the
equilibrium we have just examined, diﬀerences in immigration restrictions reﬂect diﬀerences in skill
accumulation. Conditional on the equilibrium, higher skill growth (higher p1 or p2) in a country
translates into larger inﬂows of unskilled immigration.16
This section presents a tiny extension of the model that enriches the set of factors, beyond
skill growth, that determines immigration restrictions. The expanded set of explanatory variables
might provide the basis for a better understanding of cross-country variation. Suppose that each
skilled voter has one child, that is one voter in next period’s election, just as before. But now one
15Benhabib (1996) ﬁnds a similar result.
16Ortega (2004) argues that the 1965 Amendments to US immigration policy, the origin of the large increase in
immigration in the US in the last three decades, coincided with a substantial increase in skill growth.
19unskilled voter generates α1 voters in the next period. A possible interpretation is that there are
fertility diﬀerentials by skill levels. Incidentally, it is well known that education and fertility are
inversely related, which would suggest α1 > 1. Suppose the current labor force is given by (L1,L2).
Then the distribution of children’s skills is given by
N0
2 = p1α1L1 + p2L2
N0
1 = (1 − p1)α1L1 + (1 − p2)L2,
which can be summarized by
n0 = Mα(k) =
α1p1 + p2k
α1(1 − p1) + k(1 − p2)
< M(k),
where I used that α1 > 1. Recall now that skill growth was deﬁned as γt = h(Mkt) − h(kt).
Clearly, larger values of α1 imply lower skill growth, for each given value of kt. Given the steady
state relationship between skill growth and the size (skill-content) of immigration ﬂows, higher
values of α1 (the fertility rate of unskilled workers relative to the fertility rate of skilled workers)
reduce unskilled immigration relative to the size of the native population (lower absolute value
of σ∗). The result is quite intuitive. Reaching the steady state now takes fewer current unskilled
immigrants, given their higher fertility rate.
Another interpretation is that political participation rates diﬀer by skill levels. There is some
evidence supporting that abstention is inversely related to education. Now, assume that all the
skilled vote but only a fraction α1 < 1 of the unskilled actually vote. It is easy to show that the
law of motion for the skilled ratio of actual voters becomes




(1 − p1) + k(1 − p2)
> M(k).
That is, higher (relative) abstention among the unskilled (lower α1) implies larger steady state skill
growth and a larger inﬂow of unskilled immigrants. The intuition is that one unskilled potential
voter translates into less than one eﬀective unskilled voter. So more unskilled immigrants than
before have to be admitted to maintain the steady state.
5 Only labor market eﬀects
This section considers the case where immigration only aﬀects labor market outcomes, that is,
wages in this model. There are at least two instances where this might be the case. Several
countries have occasionally implemented immigration policies that require immigrants to go back
20to their countries after some pre-speciﬁed period of time. In such cases, immigrants typically do
not obtain the right to vote in the host country and, hence, cannot directly inﬂuence the choice of
policies. Another situation where immigrants may not gain the right to vote is when citizenship (and
franchise, in particular) is only transmitted from parents to children. Until recently, Germany’s
immigration policy has been based on this principle. This section analyzes the relationship between
immigration and redistribution in these two cases. Throughout, I shall maintain the assumption
that immigrants pay taxes and receive transfers. As we shall see, equilibrium dynamics diﬀer
substantially from those described in the previous section.
5.1 Temporary migration
Consider modifying the model as follows. Suppose that immigrants (and their children) leave the
country at the end of their working lives but before their children become citizens. The key impli-
cation is that the evolution of the skills of the native population is independent from the country’s
immigration history. More speciﬁcally, nt+1 = Mnt = Mtn0, which converges monotonically to
ka > 1.
Let us examine how voters’ political preferences are determined in this case. To ﬁx ideas,




v1(k,r) + βC1(Mn), for i = 1,2,
where unskilled voters realize that next period’s state is given by nt+1 = Mnt, independently of
the choice of k and r. The same is true for skilled voters. As a result, voters’ political preferences
become purely static. Monotonicity of the payoﬀ functions, given optimally chosen tax rates,
implies a unique equilibrium policy rule:
(k(n),r(n)) =

(b(n),1) if n ≤ 1−
(kl,0) if n ≥ 1+ . (2)
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium path generated by this policy rule.17
Proposition 3. With temporary migration, the unique equilibrium path is characterized by:
i) Several periods of unskilled majority, with redistribution and unrestricted skilled immigration.
17Even if rb < 1, c1(k,rb) is an increasing function of k since it is a convex combination between two increasing
functions of k. In that case, (b(n),rb) would have to be the equilibrium policies in unskilled majority states.
21ii) After that, unrestricted unskilled immigration and zero redistribution forever.
iii) If ka ≤ 1, there is always redistribution and unrestricted skilled immigration.
5.2 Jus sanguinis
This section considers the case where the children of immigrants are not given the right to vote.
This is the case when citizenship is passed by bloodline (jus sanguinis). As a result, in the model
immigration only aﬀects the labor market and there is a growing population of disenfranchised
workers in the economy, composed of the oﬀspring of the immigrants arrived in all previous periods.
At each point in time, the native population contains natives with voting rights (citizens) and
natives without (non-citizens), that is,
Ni(t) = Nc
i (t) + Nnc
i (t), for i = 1,2.
As before, the labor force is the sum of the native population and the newly arrived immigrants:
Li(t) = Ni(t) + Ii(t), for i = 1,2.















t summarizes the skill distribution among citizens (that is, the electorate), nt summarizes
the whole native population (including the non-citizen natives) and kt the skill distribution in the
labor force (including immigrants and all natives). In this scenario the appropriate state variable
that carries the relevant political information is nc
t, the skilled ratio among citizens (voters).
There is an important diﬀerence with the scenario of temporary immigration. Now the set of
attainable skilled ratios by means of immigration depends on the skill composition of the whole
native population (nt+1 = Mkt) rather than on the skill distribution of citizens (nc
t+1 = Mnc
t). As
a result, two state variables are needed. Ratio nc
t summarizes the distribution of political power
and nt determines the set of feasible skilled ratios in the labor force:




In spite of this change, it is clear that there is, again, a unique equilibrium policy rule. As in the
case of temporary migration, the electorate is made of the oﬀspring of the initial native population
22and its evolution is exclusively dictated by the process of domestic skill accumulation, regardless
of the immigration policy choices taken in the past. So, once again, voters’ decision problems are
purely static. The unique equilibrium policy rule is given by
(k(n,nc),r(n,nc)) =

(b(n),1) if n ≤ 1−
(kl,0) if n ≥ 1+ (3)
and nc
t+1 = Mnc
t. The dynamics of immigration and redistribution are essentially identical to the
case of temporary migration.
In conclusion, when immigration only aﬀects the labor markets, immigration policy always
takes corner solutions. Initially, the policy consists of unrestricted skilled immigration, which is
eventually replaced by unrestricted unskilled immigration. In stark contrast with the steady state
result of the general model, when immigration only aﬀects the labor market, redistribution is never
compatible with unskilled immigration.
6 Voters’ attitudes toward immigration
A growing body of literature uses survey data to study the determinants of individual attitudes
toward particular policy issues. On the speciﬁc issue of immigration, Scheve and Slaughter (2001)
study the relation between individual attitudes toward immigration and one’s education level for the
US. Mayda (2003) and O’Rourke (2003) extend the analysis to several other countries. Roemer and
Van der Straeten (2003) argue that voters’ attitudes toward immigration (xenophobia) in Denmark
may have aﬀected the size of redistributive policies.
The analysis of the previous sections reveals important diﬀerences in attitudes toward immi-
gration, depending on whether voters take into account that immigrants might aﬀect domestic
politics. When voters only care about the eﬀects of immigration on the labor market, skilled voters
support open doors to unskilled immigration (and low redistribution). In turn, unskilled voters
support open doors to skilled immigration (and large redistribution). That is, immigration policy
is characterized exclusively by skill restrictions.
In contrast, when voters also take into account the eﬀect of immigration on domestic politics,
quantity restrictions on immigration arise. In the equilibrium discussed above, the unskilled ma-
jority supports an immigration policy involving a limited number of unskilled immigrants, relative
to the size of the native population.18 Moreover, in the two steady states analyzed, if voters where
18Implicitly, I am assuming a given immigrant selection rule to translate changes in skilled-to-unskilled ratios into
immigration ﬂows. Suppose, for instance, that there is a cost of issuing visas and monitoring immigrants. Then in
23asked “Regarding immigration in your country, are you in favor of increasing it, leaving it as it
is, or reducing it?”, all voters (regardless of their skill level) would answer that they support the
current immigration levels.19 The National Election Survey regularly asks this question to the
American population. Over the course of the 1990’s, 80-90% of those surveyed answered that they
supported current immigration levels or somewhat lower levels. These data suggest that voters
may be concerned about the eﬀects of current immigration on future policies.
Regarding voters’ attitudes toward immigration, the model also predicts that quantity restric-
tions should be less important in countries where immigrants do not obtain voting rights. In these
countries, voters should support large amounts of immigrants with a skill level diﬀerent from their
own. The data analyzed by O’Rourke (2003) and Mayda (2003) might provide the basis for a
more rigorous empirical analysis of voters’ attitudes toward immigration and redistribution and
how these attitudes may depend on each country’s rules to grant citizenship to second-generation
immigrants.
7 Conclusions
In a recent study, Klein and Ventura (2004) show that lifting immigration restrictions in OECD
countries would have large welfare eﬀects, due to a sizeable long-run increase in total capital and
output per worker. Their results naturally pose the question of what leads countries to adopt
immigration restrictions and what determines the evolution of these restrictions over time. The
present paper argues that immigration restrictions arise naturally as an equilibrium outcome when
voters take into account that immigrants may aﬀect future policies and, in particular, the degree
of income redistribution.
I have provided a dynamic, general equilibrium, political-economy model with endogenous immi-
gration and redistribution policies, where immigration aﬀects labor market outcomes and domestic
politics. In the model, immigrants may bring complementary skills into the country and become
citizens with voting rights. One of the main ﬁndings is the emergence of widespread support for
immigration restrictions within a country, consistent with the robust ﬁndings of survey data (Han-
son et al, 2002). The reason is that voters use immigration policy as an instrument to gain control
over redistribution policy.
Motivated by the work of Hassler et al (2002), we have analyzed the determinants of the survival
equilibrium there would only be immigrants of one type and the number of visas issued would be a function of the
transition probabilities and the size of the native population.
19Of course, unskilled voters would also support redistributive policies while skilled voters would not.
24of the welfare state. The unique feature of the present analysis has been that both redistribution
and immigration policy were endogenous. We have learned that the long-run survival of the welfare
state, in the sense of an income redistribution mechanism, is intimately linked to controlled unskilled
immigration. Voters in the model “vote for their enemies”, that is, an unskilled majority admits
unskilled immigrants in order to regenerate the political support for redistribution. We have also
seen that a time-consistent, majority-vote, immigration policy may vary over time, as the fraction
of skilled voters in the domestic population grows over time.
The present analysis has also made a technical contribution to the literature on political economy
in macroeconomics by taking one step further the class of models that can be studied analytically.
Compared to earlier work, here inﬁnitely-lived voters choose a policy vector by majority vote. And
the model allows for a time-varying skill distribution and a general production function, which
can generate a variable skill premium. This approach might prove helpful in the analysis of a
number of important related questions. For instance, it would be very interesting to study the
dynamic interaction between immigration and the welfare state when the latter includes other
realistic features such as a pension system or public education. Both issues will surely top the
political agenda in many countries in the foreseeable future.
25Appendix: Proofs
Proof lemma 1. Let n ≤ 1− and suppose that (k1,r1) is the utility-maximizing policy pair
for an unskilled voter, with r1 < rb. Since the continuation value only depends on k1, pair (k1,rb)
is preferred over (k1,r1) if and only if v1(k1,rb) > v1(k1,r1), that is
(1 − rb)F1(k1) + rbf(k1) > (1 − r1)F1(k1) + r1f(k1).
But F2(k1) > F1(k1) implies f(k1) > F1(k1). As a result, the inequality holds. Hence, in any
equilibrium, r(n) = rb if n ≤ 1−. A symmetric argument proves that r(n) = 0 if n ≥ 1+.
Proof lemma 2. Observe that Wi(k,r;n) = vi(k,r) + βCi(Mk) is an increasing function of r
for unskilled workers (for any value of k) and it is a decreasing function for skilled workers. Hence,
unskilled always choose rb = 1 and skilled choose a zero tax rate. The skilled ratio in the economy
evolves according to the law of motion nt+1 = M(nt;p1,p2). As long as nt ≤ 1−, we have rt = rb
whereas if nt ≥ 1+, the adopted tax rate is zero.
Proof proposition 1. Let n∗ < ka be a steady state, that is, n∗ = Mk(n∗) < ka. Since
M is an increasing function, k(n∗) < M−1(ka) = ka, by deﬁnition of ka. Since n < M(n) for
n < ka, it follows that k(n∗) < Mk(n∗) = n∗. Rearranging, we obtain σ∗ = k(n∗) − n∗ < 0, that
is immigration is unskilled. An analogous argument, noting that n > M(n) for n > ka, establishes
that immigration is skilled in any steady state n∗ > ka. The rest of the proposition follows from
the assumption ka > 1.
Proof lemma 3. By deﬁnition of Vi, and for any policy rule (k,r),
Vi(n) = vi(k(n),r(n)) + βCi(Mk(n)) for i = 1,2.
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Consider now the policy rule deﬁned in (1) and let n ≥ 1+. Then, the previous system of
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26implying that Ci(n) = Ci(1+) is constant for all n ≥ 1+. Furthermore, evaluating at n = 1+, we







[1 − β(p2 − p1)]
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In words, the ex ante continuation value for a voter of type i in a skilled-majority state is given by a
convex combination. The weights of the combination display less intergenerational persistence than
the one-period transition matrix (to the extent that p2 > p1). The expressions on the right-hand
side deﬁne the coeﬃcients aij(β,p1,p2) appearing in the proposition.
Next, consider an unskilled-majority state in b−1(φ) ≤ n ≤ 1−. The policy rule implies full
redistribution and k(n) = φ in these states. Hence,
Vi(n) = u[f(φ)] + βCi(1−) for i = 1,2,
given that v1(φ,1) = v2(φ,1) = u[f(φ)]. Thus, continuation values for the range of states considered
are constant functions of n. Next, evaluating the expressions at n = 1−, and using matrix notation,
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It is easy to verify that the unique solution to the system is




equal for both types of voters. The intuition is straightforward: with full redistribution, the per-
period payoﬀ does not depend on the agent’s type so the expected utility given any probability
distribution is the same.
Finally, consider an unskilled-majority state with n < b−1(φ). It follows from the prescribed
policy rule and the law of motion for skills that after a ﬁnite number of periods the state will fall
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where again v1(b(n),1) = v2(b(n),1) = u[f(b(n))] and Mb(n) = (M ◦ b)(n). It is easy to verify




βtu[f(b((M ◦ b)t(n)))] + βT(n)u[f(φ)]
1 − β
,
27for both i = 1,2. It is straightforward to check that Ci(n) is a strictly increasing function of n and
that C1(n) = C2(n) for the states considered.
Proof lemma 4. Consider any unskilled majority state, n ≤ 1−. Unskilled voters evaluate
policy pairs using
W1(k,1) = v1(k,1) + βC1(Mk),
where I already used the fact that unskilled voters always impose full redistribution. The set of
feasible skilled ratios is given by k ∈ [kl,b(n)]. Recall that v1(k,1) = u[f(k)] is an increasing
function and that C1(Mk) is non-decreasing for Mk ≤ 1− or, equivalently, for k ≤ φ. It follows
that the optimal choice equals b(n) for all n ≤ b−1(φ).
For n ∈ (b−1(φ),1−], φ clearly dominates any ratio in [kl,φ] and b(n) dominates ratios in open
interval (φ,b(n)). Note that over this range of states W1(b(n),1|n) increases in n. Thus, φ will be
the optimal unskilled choice in these states if and only if W1(φ,1) ≥ W1(b(1),1) or, equivalently,
u[f(b(1))] − u[f(φ)] ≤ β[C1(1−) − C1(1+)]. (4)









1 − p1 − β(p2 − p1)










where Eiv(φ,0) = (1 − pi)v1(φ,0) + piv2(φ,0). A close look at the previous expression shows that
C1(1+|p1) is a continuous (and increasing) function and




Thus, the right hand side of (4) is a continuous (and decreasing) function of p1 too. Note that
the left-hand side of that expression does not depend on p1 (other than through the value of φ).
Assumption 3 requires inequality (4) to hold when p1 = 0. By continuity, it will still hold for an
interval of low enough (positive) values of p1.
Proof lemma 5. Consider any skilled majority state, n ≥ 1+. Skilled voters evaluate policy
pairs using
W2(k,0) = v2(k,0) + βC2(Mk),
where I already used the fact that skilled voters always set a zero tax rate (no redistribution). The
set of feasible skilled ratios is given by k ∈ [kl,b(n)]. Recall that v2(k,0) strictly decreases in k.
28Clearly, φ dominates any other choice of k in interval [φ,b(n)]. The reason is that C2(Mk) =
C2(1+) is constant across those values of k. Similarly, among values of k in interval [M−1φ,φ], that
is Mk ∈ [φ,1−], ratio M−1φ is dominant given that C2(Mk) = C2(1−) is constant too.
Let us now turn to choices of k in closed interval [kl,M−1φ]. For any such choice of k, we have
W2(k,0) = v2(k,0) + βC2(Mk),
where v2(k,0) is decreasing while C2(Mk) is non-decreasing (lemma 3). An upper bound for the
expression can be constructed as follows. For all k ∈ [kl,M−1φ],




Next, I shall derive conditions for W2(φ,0) > max{W2(M−1φ,0), ¯ U}. It is easy to show that
W2(φ,0) > W2(M−1φ,0) if and only if
v2(M−1φ,0) − v2(φ,0) <










where C2(1−) = C1(1−), as argued in lemma 3. Evaluating the previous expression at p2 = 1, and
rearranging terms, we can see that W2(φ,0) > W2(M−1φ,0) if and only if





v2(φ,0) > (1 − β)v2(M−1φ,0) + βu[f(φ)]. (5)
If the previous inequality holds, continuity of the expressions in p2 implies that it will hold for an
interval of p2 around one.
Similarly, we obtain that W2(φ,0) > ¯ U if and only if







Evaluating the previous expression at p2 = 1, and using lemma 3, we obtain equivalent expression





v2(φ,0) > (1 − β)v2(kl,0) + βu[f(φ)], (6)
29coinciding with assumption 4. A careful comparison of the two suﬃcient conditions we just derived
reveals that condition (6) implies (5). In conclusion, under assumption 4, high enough values of p2
guarantee the best response for skilled voters in skilled-majority states.
Proof proposition 3. Regardless of kt, the state converges monotonically to ka. Since v1(k,1)
is an increasing function, in any state n ≤ 1−, unskilled voters’ favorite policy pair is (k,r) =
(b(n),1). In skilled-majority states, skilled voters’ favorite policy pair is (k,r) = (kl,0) since v2(k,0)
is a decreasing function. Given n0 < 1, there exists T < ∞ such that nT = (M ◦ b)T(Mkl) > 1,
which implies the equilibrium path described in the proposition.
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